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Abstract 
The majority of wars are fought in impoverished countries with often devastating and 
transformative impacts on their urban spaces. Nevertheless, the relationship between 
acts of terror and development is under-explored and little focus is placed on the 
impact on cities of the global South. In the wake of 9/11 the critical gaze has been 
trained firmly on terrorism in the global North, including its impact on cities: New 
York, Madrid, London. Defining terrorism in terms of acts of terror the paper 
recognises that urban centres are most susceptible to this form of political violence 
because of the likelihood of greater impact and visibility afforded by cities. 
Eschewing a ‘developing’/’developed’ dichotomy this paper nevertheless 
demonstrates that while terrorism has levelled risk across cities of the North and 
South, vulnerabilities in developing country cities are far greater. It is here that the 
link between terrorism and development can be most tightly drawn. It is further 
suggested that the incidence of urban terror is greatest in cities of less developed 
countries and that urban terrorism is helping define a shift from ‘peasant wars of the 
20th century’ to the ‘urban wars of the 21st century’, a shift not divorced from 
encompassing global forces.  
 
 
Introduction 
The collapse of New York’s Twin Towers on 11th September 2001 dramatically demonstrated the 
susceptibility of cities to terrorist attacks. Two and a half years later, on the 11th March 2004, 
bombs were detonated on packed commuter trains in Madrid, killing 191 and injuring over 1,500 
people, extending an amplified sense of urban vulnerability to cities in Europe. This was 
reinforced by the London bombings in July 2005, which again targeted ordinary city dwellers 
going about their daily lives. Subsequent analyses, contributing to the burgeoning literature on 
the ‘war on terror’ that grew up in the wake of 9/11, have examined the consequences of targeted 
urban terror campaigns in cities of the global North (Cutter et al, 2003; Glaeser and Shapiro, 
2001; Graham, 2004). However, what Appadurai (1996: 152-3) called the ‘implosion of global 
and national conflicts into the urban world’ (Appadurai, 1996, pp. 152-3) is a phenomenon that 
cannot ignore cities of the global South.1  On the contrary, cities absorb much of the impact and 
fallout from contemporary conflict and war, both directly and indirectly, with consequences both 
for development and governance at the local and national levels. Moreover, many large cities of 
                                                 
1 For ease of expression, I use inter-changeably the terms ‘North’ and ‘South’ on the one hand and developed and 
developing countries, on the other, to refer respectively to industrialised and low- and middle-income countries.  
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the South, from Karachi and Mumbai, to Nairobi and Bogotá, have been targets of episodic or 
sustained acts of terror. 
 
The London bombings proved beyond a doubt the extent to which international networks operate 
across increasingly permeable international borders with cities serving both as nodes for the 
articulation of international terror networks as well as targets of terrorism. When cities in 
developing countries – particularly those in the Islamic world – are discussed in relation to 
terrorism, it is often in the context of ‘breeding grounds’ for international terrorists, trained and 
headed for urban targets. In 2002, for example, CNN reported that Osama bin Laden’s network 
had replicated a small western-style city in eastern Afghanistan in order to train recruits in urban 
terrorist tactics, stating that: ‘Al Qaeda has created a series of exercises to conduct terrorist 
operations … in the urban environment. That is, they are able to operate in cities.’ (CNN 21st 
August 2002). Indeed, a vicious circle is increasingly in evidence, whereby cities are targeted in 
the ‘war on terror’ – Kabul and Baghdad come immediately to mind – breeding further terrorism, 
counter terrorism and so on in a seemingly endless cycle.  
 
In warfare, cities have always been sites of protection and of attack. Across much of the global 
South they are additionally impacted upon by the knock on effects of wars fought in the 
countryside. Indeed, it is argued that Eric Wolf’s (1969) notion of Peasant Wars of the Twentieth 
Century is giving way to the phenomenon of ‘urban wars of the twenty-first century’, wars that 
cannot be explained outside an understanding of how they articulate with international links and 
processes within a hegemonic global context. This is not to neglect local or national imperatives 
or indeed rural areas. Nor is it to imply that Wolf did not recognise links between peasant 
struggles and urban interests. Nevertheless it is important to understand, for example, the impact 
of Angola’s civil (but quintessentially Cold War driven) war on the city of Luanda, both in terms 
of attacks on the city as well as the exponential growth of the capital as a result of people moving 
in from surrounding rural areas. Similarly, conflict and terror in Jerusalem cannot be understood 
outside of Israeli occupation of West Bank and Gaza and the protracted dispute between Israel 
and Palestine. However, to ignore the urban dimensions of the conflict is both to miss the point 
and to miss the opportunity of ‘[t]he urban scale, as a site for or actor in the resolution of 
international social conflicts, ethnonational conflicts or inter-state war’ (Stanley, 2003:11-12). 
Indeed, Bollens (1999:7) has argued in the case of divided cities that ‘[t]he disintegration of 
many states is compelling international aid organizations, mediators, and political negotiators to 
increasingly look at substate regions and urban areas as more appropriate scales of involvement.’  
 
When examining the incidence and impact of terrorism in cities of the developing world, it is 
important to think very carefully about which of the many definitions of terrorism to take as a 
point of departure. Following Jonathan Barker’s lead, the definition employed here has three 
main elements: a) violent acts threatened or employed; b) violent acts directed against civilian 
targets; and c) violent acts threatened or perpetrated for political objectives (Barker, 2003, p. 23). 
Unlike some characterisations, this definition embraces acts of terror committed by states. 
Although contentious, this is considered critical; for as Barker points out:  
 
Definitions that exclude state terrorism remain blind to a major source of the violence and 
fear that is visited upon civilians around the world. State terrorism and group terrorism, it 
is true, have rather different features, but their effects on people and politics are similar 
and they are often closely linked’ (Barker, 2003, p. 24).  
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Moreover, by putting more focus on terrorist acts rather than actors, this definition also avoids the 
vexed question of when one person’s ‘terrorist’ becomes another’s ‘freedom fighter’ and escapes 
the essentialist categories associated with the discourse of the current ‘war on terror’. There is a 
danger that a focus on acts strips the analysis of considerations of power. While terrorist acts are 
themselves incredibly powerful – not least because they transgress what is perceived to be 
‘normal’ -  it is also the case that there are often great differentials in power between those 
espousing the causes advanced by terrorist acts and those against whom such causes are pitted. 
This observation is made without wishing to portray terrorism as a ‘weapon of the weak’ (Scott, 
1985). 
 
Here the largely negative implications of terrorist activities for development are examined, as 
well as the potential of cities for propelling reconstruction and peace building. The essay 
concludes by suggesting that while the specific challenges faced by cities of the South cannot be 
under-estimated, the very phenomenon of urban terrorism is serving to break down any sense of a 
rigid binary between the ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ worlds, at least in the urban realm. The 
implication for development is that the ‘them’ and ‘us’ attitude prevalent in the international 
security discourse, and creeping into development discourse, is not only misleading but is itself 
damaging to both development co-operation and global security. Moreover insisting on a clear 
divide between the notions of ‘them’ and ‘us’ serves to fuel ever-intensifying cycles of violence 
born of ‘terrorism’ and ‘counter-terrorism’, levelling risk across cities of the world, while leaving 
the vulnerabilities of urban dwellers highly unequal.   
 
Cities, Terrorism and Globalisation 
 
One of the most striking things about the blasts on the London Underground was the extent to 
which they illustrated how the politics of terror have become internationalised.  While the events 
of 9/11 demonstrated the devastation that organisations based far outside the US could inflict on 
American cities, the more recent series of al-qa’ida  related attacks in London further elucidated 
the truly global nature of terrorism: the attackers were British, seemingly orchestrated from 
Pakistan (their country of origin), arguably in support of a cause rooted in the Arab world. 
Clearly, grievances felt in one part of the globe can be felt in many others and the more 
cosmopolitan the city the more grievances are likely to resonate. This is not, of course, inevitable. 
If Pakistani youth in the North of England are resentful and aggrieved due to unemployment, 
exclusion and real or perceived racism, it is because multiculturalism has failed to translate into 
real cosmopolitanism. If, on the other hand, immigrants and refugees have opportunities and are 
treated with respect, it is more likely that the positive face of the cosmopolis will emerge. 
However, when people feel aggrieved or disenfranchised in one context, they can achieve 
satisfaction from championing a cause across the globe that somehow resonates with their own 
misgivings or discontent. This has long been a feature of solidarity movements and today 
international causes are facilitated by enhanced networking. 
 
The geography of terror has moved on to the global stage largely by way of cities and specific 
urban symbols. In part, the message of the London bombers was that any war perceived to have 
its origins in London would come back to roost in London. While London was the site of 
thousands of people of multiple origins taking to the streets in protest against the war, 7th July 
2005 also stand as a symbolic gesture against the Anglo-American alliance that went to war in 
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Afghanistan and Iraq. In a quintessentially cosmopolitan city like London, the events of July 
2005 are further emblematic of how the victims of the bombs were inextricably linked to 
families, friends and sympathisers across the globe.  
 
The notion of an internationally networked world economic system is not new (Castells, 1989, 
1998, 1996). Nor is it any longer revelatory to describe cities as critical nodes in systems of 
global exchange (Sassen, 1991, 1994). However, a more recent and sobering recognition of a 
‘networked urban world’ (Hall and Pfeiffer, 2000) suggests that terrorism has fundamentally 
changed the geographies of global inclusion and exclusion (Flint, 2003). Not only is international 
communication easier than ever before but also many of the supportive urban infrastructures or 
‘lifelines’, such as transportation and communication, are available as targets for terrorist 
networks seeking to exploit the vulnerabilities of the ‘network society’ (Esser, 2004; Miller, 
2003; Dezzani & Lakshmanan, 2003). However, not all cities, nor all of their inhabitants, are 
similarly networked and few under conditions of their own choosing. Consequently, we need to 
go beyond seeing networked cities simply as providing an optimum environment for the 
operation of global terrorism, to understand the accompanying networks of global, national and 
local power.  
 
In order to understand why cities become targets of acts of terror and the impact of such acts on 
urban dwellers, it is necessary to say something about the nature of cities. The physical 
environment of the city is important, as is the role of cities in national development, alongside the 
economies of scale provided by cities in addressing human well-being through public goods and 
services. All these dimensions are attractive to those seeking maximum impact from their acts of 
destruction and disruption. Moreover, in cities, institutional organisation and human interaction 
takes place within urban spaces. As argued elsewhere, ‘Struggles for survival and power are 
played out in physical spaces and built environments that are spatial and organisational 
expressions of social relations and contesting realities’ (Beall, 1997, p. 3). Urban space has been 
used by planners to put or keep people in their place, while urban dwellers claim, challenge and 
change space and its uses. Hence terrorist acts not only attack the built environment and the urban 
political economy but cities as social institutions and the very fact of urbanism itself.  
 
At the same time, an attack on a given city need not necessarily be a deliberate attack on the city 
itself. Cities transcend national boundaries and have come to represent something bigger than the 
countries in which they are located. For instance, it is questionable as to how likely the bombs in 
the busy urban tourist centres of Bali and Sharm el Sheikh were aimed at the towns themselves, 
or even the Indonesian or Egyptian governments. Similarly, the al-qa’ida  backed bombings of 
the Australian embassy in Jakarta and the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam also 
had an international focus. Thus, unlike civil wars and other instances of urban political violence, 
terrorism is not only domestic in impact and reach. Instead, urban terrorist acts in developing 
countries are used to communicate and send signals across the globe, with their impact 
ricocheting across continents, or they become enmeshed in the rhetoric and policy agendas of the 
global ‘war on terror’. It is thus not unreasonable to speak of urban terror as a sort of international 
language. 
 
That urban terror operates simultaneously at both global and local levels means that it must be 
interpreted as profoundly geopolitical. This becomes clear, for example, when one considers that 
the kind of terror/counter-terror dynamics evident for so long in the cities of Israel and Palestine 
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and now being replicated on a much wider international stage, articulated across strategic urban 
sites. A few anecdotal examples serve to illustrate the point. In July 2002, the Colombian 
authorities foiled an attempt by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to fly a 
plane into government buildings in the capital, Bogotá (BBC News, 2002). After the July 2005 
London bombings, there were press reports of Britain consulting Israeli politicians and security 
services in order to bring in expertise on the subject of ‘dealing with suicide bombers’ in urban 
centres (Shang-jen Li, 2005).  And precedence can be found in the presence of the US military at 
the Battle of Jenin in Israeli Defence Force (IDF) uniforms, in order to observe the way the IDF 
conducted itself within the Palestinian urban terrain, with a view to applying such methods in 
their own military actions in Arab cities, despite Jenin having been widely been considered a 
failure and a grave violation of human rights (Graham, 2004). 
 
Cities of the South as Arenas of Violence 
 
When urban centres become arenas of terror, the way violence is visited upon them can vary 
enormously. For example, cities can be caught in the crossfire of wider international conflicts, 
chosen for attack simply because they afford a high degree of visibility or because urban targets 
promise maximum impact. Given the proximity of urban living and the technologies central to 
modern urban life, cities offer the potential for devastating attacks. The London bombings or the 
periodic targeting of buses and passenger ferries in Mindanao and Manila by the Philippine Abu 
Sayyaf Group, are testimony to this. City life can itself be absolutely central to the terrorists’ 
political goals. Here Israeli attempts to destroy Palestinian towns provide an example, 
constituting an attack on Palestinian urbanism itself.  
 
In identifying cities as arenas for acts of terror, it is important to recognise that these are just one 
form of violence faced by urban populations. Cities are also sites of political violence and 
opposition, civil war and conflictual competition for access to and control over urban space and 
resources. Urban violence can take the form of communal riots, such as those that from time to 
time tear Indian cities apart, or see attacks on vulnerable populations, such as the killing of 
hundreds of children by vigilantes every year in the streets of Brazilian cities. Such battles can 
overlap or mesh with criminal violence, gang warfare, or other features of the brittleness of urban 
life, but should not be confused with internationally linked terrorism, although they often are in 
the rhetoric of the ‘war on terror’. 
 
Aside from the various forms of man-made violence, cities of developing countries (especially in 
Africa and Asia) are vulnerable to new and growing forms of specifically urban risk (Mitchell, 
2003). Under conditions of rapid urbanisation, these range from inadequate infrastructure, to poor 
service delivery and deficient or corrupt local governments. The effects of unregulated globalised 
industrialisation and climate change, for example, are generating new forms of urban 
environmental hazard alongside older ones (Wisner, 2004). Low-income urban populations are at 
particular risk, living in vulnerable locations exposed to the effects of poor water quality, 
petrochemical explosions, landslides and earthquakes, as well as urban violence and crime 
(Douglass, 1992; Patel, 1997a, 1997b).   
 
Nancy Scheper-Hughes (1993) and Daniel Goldstein (2004) refer to ‘everyday violence’ and 
‘spectacular violence’ respectively. Associated with the latter, terrorism is a hazard that derives 
from a very deliberate attempt to unsettle populations but it is important to recognise that it is, in 
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many cases, a relatively small risk compared to other hazards. As such it differs significantly 
from the more prosaic and pernicious threats that give rise to urban vulnerability. Thus, while the 
risk associated with a range of possible terrorist threats is enormous, James K. Mitchell argues 
that efforts would be better spent focusing on the particular vulnerabilities of urban populations.  
Terrorist acts, he argues, ‘challenge us to carefully examine changing relationships between the 
two main components of environmental hazard (risks and vulnerabilities), and to increase our 
efforts to understand the more neglected component of the two, vulnerability’ (Mitchell, 2003, p. 
21). 
 
Cities of the South are particularly vulnerable because poverty, urbanisation and the rapid and 
unplanned expansion of cities exacerbate the impact of terrorism. According to recent United 
Nations projections, 2.2 billion people are likely to be added to the world’s population between 
2000 and 2030, with the cities of Africa, Asia and Latin America expected to absorb most of this 
increase. Indeed, by 2030 it is anticipated that 60% of the global population will live in cities and 
towns, with nearly all of this growth being absorbed into the urban areas of the world’s least 
developed regions (UN Habitat, 2004/05). The pace of urbanisation in the South has caused some 
to predict imminent urban dystopias, characterised by flood tides of people housed in walled 
islands of cheek-by-jowl wealth and extreme poverty (Hall and Pfeiffer, 2000). Cities are also 
vibrant and creative places (Hardoy et al, 1992). Nevertheless, many of the distinctive qualities of 
urbanism derive from the fact that ‘spatial proximity brings socio-economic diversity into focus’ 
(Montgomery et. al., 2004, p.71).  
 
While cities are the source of cosmopolitanism and conviviality, it is also the case that as urban 
populations grow and become more differentiated, social distance is often magnified. The 
demonisation of ethnic and religious minorities has been a central feature of urban terrorist 
attacks in developing countries. These can be identified from Ahmedabad to Karachi and from 
Beirut to Sarajevo. Moreover, conflicts rooted in divided cities where people are at war with 
highly ‘othered’ neighbouring communities are equally mirrored in the West (Davis, 2004). 
However, as demonstrated by Robin Soans (2005) in his recent play Talking to Terrorists,2 
similarities are often as evident as differences. The script was based entirely on actual 
conversations he had conducted with people formerly involved in terrorism. In one such 
conversation, a former member of the Ulster Volunteer Force from Belfast tells of how he met 
and became friends with a member of the IRA whilst in prison:  
 
‘We were both working-class men from Belfast; we had both put cardboard into our shoes 
when it rained; by and large, I could have lived his life, and he mine.’ 
 
It is likely that these dynamics parallel experiences of civil conflict in the Balkans or Rwanda, 
where people literally found themselves at war with their neighbours. Similarly, the rise of no-go 
areas, gated communities and the privatisation of security, bred by fear and insecurity, is equally 
a global urban phenomenon (Beall et al, 2002; Blakely and Snyder, 1997; Caldeira, 2000; Davis, 
1990). 
 
                                                 
2 Robin Soan’s play Talking to Terrorists, directed by Max Stafford-Clarke for the theatre company Out of Joint, 
toured in England in 2005. Its recent London run took place at the Royal Court Theatre.  
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In drawing conclusions about cities of the South as arenas for violence it is interesting to note 
that, conventionally, war in developing countries has been thought of as a rural phenomenon, 
involving peasant soldiers and being conducted across mainly rural terrains. Reinforced by 
images of Amilcar Cabral, Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh or Ché Guevara, there were of course 
urban exceptions in the anti-colonial struggles across the world. The importance of Managua for 
the Sandinistas, the militant role of urban workers in colonial Africa and the now iconic example 
of Battle of Algiers3 are all instances that are easily recalled. Nevertheless, for the most part a 
rural focus predominates in subsequent analyses of anti-colonial struggles, civil wars and the 
armed uprisings accompanying struggles for land, water and other essential resources. However, 
Wolf’s (1969) Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century are increasingly giving way to what we 
might call urban wars of the twenty-first century (although it should be noted that Wolf 
recognised that peasant wars sometimes arose as a result of opportunities to ally with urban 
interests). What is different today is that equivalent examples of revolutionary violence, such as 
the Chiapas in Mexico or rural uprisings in Nepal, operate within complex axes of interest that 
span national, regional and international localities and where rural-urban linkages seem more 
tightly drawn.  
 
The effect of terrorist acts on cities of the global South is not well understood. However, given 
that the national economies of developing countries are less competitive, it makes it far more 
difficult for them to recover after a severe terrorist attack. For example, the al-qa’ida  bombing of 
a hotel in Mombassa in November 2002 was to the residents of that city the last straw in the 
region’s downward spiral into poverty and banditry (Richards, 2002). The impact of the 
bombings in Sharm-el-Sheikh and Bali has been equally substantial. Moreover, in the context of 
weak governments and flailing economies, such as in Afghanistan, it is more difficult to 
undertake reconstruction, both physical and social (Beall and Esser, 2005). More generally, 
terrorism and the vulnerabilities on which it plays reduce the space for social and economic 
interaction and brake the economic growth and social development of affected nations (Dezzani 
and Lakshmanan, 2003). There are certainly differences in the incidence of terror between cities 
of the North and  South. In the industrialised countries it is much lower (if Israel is discounted), 
despite the greater analytical focus on cities of the North since 9th September, 2001. Colombia, 
for instance, above all other countries, has had the highest number of attacks that can be 
classified as terrorist, with a reputed 191 terrorist incidents in 2001 (Barker, 2003, p. 34). While 
the risk associated with terrorism in the South are very similar to those in the North, one of the 
insights that can be gleaned from the study of urban hazards in general is that the outcomes differ 
substantially in the South (Wisner, 2004). This is the case for terrorism as much as it is for 
earthquakes or heat waves. Under such conditions, cities are doubly afflicted, by being the targets 
of actual attacks and primary recipients of the economic and social side effects from which it is 
difficult to recover, underscoring the contention that vulnerability is worst in urban areas, 
especially in developing countries (Mitchell, 2003).  
 
Urbicide and State Terrorism 
 
                                                 
3 Made in 1965, Battle for Algiers was directed by Gillo Pontecorvo. The film has for decades been studied by 
liberation movements across the globe. Interestingly, the Pentagon held a screening of it in 2003, with a view to 
understanding more about the situation they faced in Iraq and the tactical options open both to them and their 
opponents. See:  http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2005/07/28/2003265387. 
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Given the definition employed in this article, violence inflicted on civilian populations for 
political purposes by state actors is taken to be a form of terrorism, and one that is central to our 
analysis of urban terror in the developing world. The use of political violence in and against 
cities, as a deliberate attempt to deprive people of the benefits of urban life, goes to the heart of 
Graham’s analysis in Cities, War and Terrorism (Graham, 2004). Following Marshall Berman, 
Graham also uses the concept of ‘urbicide’ to describe the ways in which cities are systematically 
and violently targeted (Berman, 1987; Graham, 2004). In this view, urban targets are not only 
associated with terror attacks and war but also pernicious urban planning, evictions, involuntary 
relocation and the deliberate destruction of urban infrastructures for political purposes (Davis, 
2004). Moreover, as Graham points out, the link between militarism and urban planning is often 
very close, even to the extent that the same personnel are involved.  
 
The most obvious example from the South is that of South Africa, where the apartheid state 
sought to keep the black population of cities restricted to those people with jobs and a pass giving 
them permission to live in urban areas. When this policy faltered the regime resorted to 
bulldozing settlements and forced removals to rural Bantustans, giving rise to what Murray has 
called ‘displaced urbanisation’ (Murray, 1987). Such forms of violence against the city and urban 
dwellers are not confined to apartheid South Africa. While never couched in the language of 
terrorism, the legacy of colonialism is one in which the ‘pacification’ or ‘regularisation’ of cities 
featured to a considerable degree. Indeed the wholesale attempt to destroy certain urban spaces or 
to disperse particular urban populations was a recognisable feature of empire and one that has 
persisted in some contexts to the present. In contemporary Kabul, foreign military personnel 
actively and assertively participate in urban planning processes, despite being viewed by many of 
the Afghans involved, as members of an occupying force. 
In many ways, the enhanced vulnerability of urban life in the South is best epitomised by 
instances of state terrorism. While not exclusively confined to the developing world, state 
terrorism is more widespread in the South where many countries still fall under authoritarian 
regimes or are victim of violent state institutions. Under such conditions, urbanity is often one of 
the first targets of states wishing to exert control by means of terror. For example, the Taliban, an 
armed non-state organisation whose origins were rural, succeeded in capturing the Afghanistan 
state and forming a regime based on terror.  Herold goes so far as to argue that the Taliban: 
.... represented the forceful imposition upon the city of distorted, traditional, 
decentralized, rural value and lifestyles [....] one might say it was the revenge of the poor 
countryside against the city, (Herold, 2004, p.313) 
While it might be argued that Afghanistan’s recent history offers a fairly idiosyncratic case, the 
destruction of structures and symbols of urbanism is not unique and constitutes a common feature 
of state terrorism and can be used for strategic advantage. In this way, for example, Israeli 
attempts to counteract Palestinian terrorism have often involved preventing Palestinians from 
forming enduring urban centres, with Palestinian urbanism being regarded as a ‘cancer’ on the 
body of the Israeli state (Graham 2004, Weizman 2004).  
That activities aimed at eliminating urbanism fall within the realms of state terrorism is 
confirmed by Ariel Sharon’s words after a suicide bomber killed 19 and injured 172 people at a 
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Pesach dinner in a crowded seaside hotel in Netanya, Israel in March 2002. In remarks that 
preceded by a few weeks the bulldozing of Jenin in April 2002, he told his ministers:  
We are in a hard war against a cruel and bloodthirsty enemy…We must cause them 
losses, casualties…so that they understand they will gain nothing by terrorism’ 
(Hills, 2004, p, 142).  
Beyond civil war or inter-state conflict, the kind of destruction of urban settlements pursued with 
such vigour by Sharon constitutes acts of terror that have been employed extensively elsewhere 
in the developing world. Examples of ‘ethnic cleansing’, such as took place in the Balkans, are 
not examples of urbicide as they are not necessarily directed against the urban fabric. On the 
contrary they often seek to preserve physical if not social resources for the victors. This is not the 
case with ‘urban cleansing’ such as is evident in contemporary Zimbabwe. While perhaps not a 
straightforward attack on urbanism per se, it has resulted thus far in around 700,000 people losing 
their homes, livelihoods or both (UN Habitat report, July 2005). At one level it can be 
characterised as a targeted political campaign akin to ‘urbicide’. At another it is very likely aimed 
at punishing urban voters who sympathise with the powerful Movement for Democratic Change 
opposition party established in 1999. It may also be aimed at swelling the ranks of the rural poor 
who are more dependent on government and therefore more supportive of it (BBC News, 2005). 
As such, a focus on urbanism should not obscure the class dynamics involved.  
The failure of Mugabe’s regime in Zimbabwe to expand formal employment or income earning 
opportunities inevitably led urban dwellers in Harare to engage in irregular economic activities. 
This in turn became central to the reason why the urban poor were targeted (Brett, 2005). The 
residents of the Harare settlements that were bulldozed, illustrated in Figure 1, fall into two main 
groups. On the one hand are elderly homeowners, unemployed and subsisting through the rents 
received from subletting rooms, outbuildings and houses to low-income urban tenants. On the 
other are the tenants themselves who are much younger, with few prospects and who are largely 
ignored by government policies. As a result they are dependant on informal sources of income 
inimical to the interests of the better off and aspirant supporters and beneficiaries of the Mugabe 
regime. Very much urban dwellers, many among the urban poor lack support or a sense of safety 
in the rural areas. Hence they are caught between town and countryside, reportedly living in ‘the 
bush’ on the city limits. The example of ‘urban cleansing’ in Zimbabwe offers an important 
reminder that class dynamics are intrinsic components both of urbanism and state terrorism.  
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Figure 1: Satellite Image of Destruction of Urban Settlement in Harare 
Source: International Alliance of Inhabitants (2005).  
 
Insecurity of tenure is a central vulnerability of many urban populations and one that is 
exacerbated by much wider examples of ‘urban cleansing’, whereby under conditions of 
‘urbicide’, states perpetrate acts of terror on their own people. Beyond the immediate example of 
Harare above, it is possible to cite a number of other contemporary examples of state terrorism. 
In 2001 and 2002 in Asia alone, 1.8 million people were evicted from their homes and another 
3.9 million were under immediate threat of eviction (ACHR newsletter). Between July and 
October 2001, 12,000 families were evicted from the Agargoan area of Dhaka under the 
Caretaker Government of Bangladesh, in the name of clearing up criminal elements in the city. 
Around the same time, the governor of Jakarta was beginning his own ‘clean-up’ campaign. By 
November 2003, approximately 50,000 people in Indonesia’s capital had been evicted. The list 
goes on. In Karachi, according to estimates of the city’s Urban Resource Centre, a total of 16,470 
houses have been bulldozed as a result of evictions since 1992 (Urban Resource Centre, 2001). In 
Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban residents of Kabul who live in or close to the city centre 
have had to cope with several incidents of urban cleansing, allegedly to revitalise the urban 
economy but in some cases clearly following elite interests and largely detached from mutually 
agreed local economic development strategies.  
Evictions and the bulldozing of informal settlements are such major causes of urban poverty that 
security of tenure was taken up by UN-Habitat as one of two major themes to take into the new 
millennium.4 Of course UN-Habitat does not deal with tenure issues from the perspective of state 
terrorism. Indeed, there is an argument that by describing such gross violations of human rights in 
this way is to undermine the rights agenda and to fall foul of the ‘hype’ associated with the ‘war 
                                                 
4 The other is Urban Governance.  
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on terror’. However, there is equally no reason why states should escape being included under the 
rubric of terrorism and to exclude them would be to overlook some of the most substantial acts of 
political violence against cities and citizens in the developing world. That said it is not just states 
that deliberately enact violence on people in cities. As Martin Shaw points out, ‘Ethnic-
nationalist political movements often draw on rural and small-town hatred of the city’ (Shaw, 
2004, p. 145). The Abu Sayyaf separatists in Mindanao, for example, direct much of their vitriol 
and indeed their terror specifically at Manila (Cragin and Chalk, 2003). However, those episodes 
of terror that have had the most devastating impact on cities have usually been state-led, with 
many having been backed by the United States. When external sovereign states become involved 
in perpetrating acts of terror in another nation, distinguishing between war and state terrorism can 
be a thorny area. It has been frequently asserted that the war on terrorism is a war of terrorism 
(Gregory, 2004, cited in Graham, 2004; Pilger, 2002) and in Kabul, Baghdad, Palestine and 
elsewhere, civilians have arguably been targeted for the purpose of spreading fear and exerting 
dominance.  Put another way and in the words of C. Douglas Lummis (1994, p. 304, cited in 
Herold, 2004), ‘Air bombardment is the terrorism of the rich’, a terrorism perpetrated against 
cities where poor people are particularly vulnerable and where the prospect of reconstruction and 
recovery that much more difficult. 
Urban Terrorism and Development  
Urban acts of terror are not only a geopolitical but very much a development issue. The idea of 
cities as heroic sites of civilisation is turned on its head by acts of terror (Graham, 2004). They 
destroy what development has built, in relation to both the physical and social fabric and cause 
cities to regress in development terms. Writing about the first Gulf War in 1990-91, Gautam 
Banarji notes that the violent assault on Baghdad’s infrastructure by US forces had the capacity to 
reduce what was previously a fairly advanced economy to a ‘pre-industrial age’ (Banarji, 1997, p. 
199). Terror onslaughts by incumbent regimes and US-led coalitions have subsequently led to 
similar outcomes in Kabul, Gaza, and other cities across the Middle East, including Baghdad 
once more.  Terrorist acts divert resources away from investment in areas of development that 
promote growth and poverty eradication and when the state itself is a perpetrator of terror, 
another impact is that development assistance is often withdrawn, resulting in further blows to the 
development process. For example, development in Zimbabwe will suffer not only because of the 
devastating effect of ‘urban cleansing’ but also because donors are concerned not to provide aid 
to the Mugabe government for fear of propping up an authoritarian regime. When organisations 
such as al-qa’ida  are present in a country, ironically the effect is often opposite, with aid to that 
country increasing in the hope that it will help diminish their influence. Given the spurious 
connection between terrorism and poverty and the long-term nature of pro-poor growth strategies, 
this approach might be questioned if the latter remain the critical focus of development 
cooperation. Critical for the monitoring of humanitarian and development aid is whether when it 
is increased, it is actually used to further the fundamental goals of development or whether, for 
example, it fuels the repression of citizens in the name of counter-terror. Well before the ‘War on 
Terror’ the efficacy of aid was questions, testified to by the reams written and many conferences 
held on the subject. Moreover, for a long time aid has been seen as propping up unsavoury 
regimes (Duffield, 1992). However, as pointed out in the introduction, the ‘War on Terror’ has 
tightened the noose conjoining the twin heads of security and development and in such a way that 
it is not always clear how the latter can remain of equal value and stature.  
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Many of the resources directed towards reducing terrorism – especially since 11 September 2001 
– have not targeted root causes but have been channelled into surveillance, emergency planning 
and training operatives in counter-terrorism. This has detrimental effects on other sectors of 
development, as suggested in the introduction.  In both Tanzania and Kenya, for example, 
USAID has invested in training centres and emergency planning relating to terrorism, while these 
countries lack fundamental infrastructures to deal with hazards such as floods, droughts or public 
health issues (Wisner, 2004). As such, the proportionality of urban hazards has been skewed by 
the war on terror and development in many sectors crucial to managing urban hazards has been 
hindered by the focus on counter-terrorism. These processes affect both the global South and 
North alike. For example, it is arguable that the resources ploughed into the department of 
Homeland Security in the US have weakened the state’s ability to cope with more common 
threats to its urban centres, the poor response to Hurricane Katrina being a case in point. .  In an 
unfortunate irony, the disproportionate focus on counter-terrorism by developed countries stands 
to leave their own cities open to increased vulnerabilities; hence, after Hurricane Katrina, the 
widespread perception that New Orleans was a city reduced to ‘third world’ levels of chaos.  
The impact of terrorist acts on domestic policy and the delivery capacity of governments is also 
important. In the case of urban governance, the latter is undermined by one of the knock-on 
effects of terrorist acts and urban violence: the rise of private security and gated communities in 
which better off residents opt out of both public service delivery and local democracy. Moreover, 
it is often the case that those who perpetrate terrorist acts surface from the ranks of the better off. 
It may be that targeted urban development programmes might yield rewards in terms of reducing 
support for terrorist acts, although on their own they are by no means sufficient (Cragin and 
Chalk, 2003). Policies designed to assist particular marginalised or disaffected communities are 
difficult because they signal lack of parity in the treatment of citizens. This can reinforce inter-
communal distrust, especially in tight urban spaces and lead to discontent (Cragin and Chalk, 
2003, p. 13).  However, whether urban development can reduce the incidence of terrorist acts is 
hard to say and attribution is almost impossible to ascribe. Despite this sober prognosis, this is 
not an argument for abandoning urban reconstruction and development. 
Cities can play a vital role in helping to resolve conflicts and rebuild societies. Antanas Mockus, 
the former mayor of Bogotá, for example, has written of his experiences attempting to change 
civic culture and attitudes to violence in the city. In part due to mayoral efforts to change 
perceptions of citizens’ duties and responsibilities in respect of the law and in part to a concerted 
and partially successful attempt to dispel negative perceptions of Bogotá, he has argued that 
violence is increasingly seen as morally and culturally unacceptable. While still rife, crime and 
homicide have dropped significantly in the last decade and, crucially, it appears that citizens feel 
an ownership of these positive results (Mockus, 2004). Just as the visibility of urban targets are 
crucial to the success of terrorist acts, the profile of cities is also central to their potential role in 
peace-building. Indeed, some of the very properties of urban life – diversity, cosmopolitanism 
and creativity – can contribute to a defiant resilience and progress towards peace. More tangible 
peace resources include proximity to decision-makers and financial resources, the protection or 
reconstruction of vital urban services, as well as opportunities for non-violent political action and 
conflict management.  
 
Embracing cities as sites for peace requires engaging with difficult contradictions. In Nicosia, 
while Turkish and Greek Cypriots were divided by the Green Line, they were equally dependent 
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upon on the effective operation and maintenance of subterranean sewers, as were black and white 
South Africans, residentially segregated under apartheid. In Palestine, an organisation perceived 
as terrorist by the Israelis is functioning at a city level in ways that could be construed as 
constructively working towards peace. Despite being in prison, Wajia Qawais – a leading 
member of Hamas – was recently elected as Mayor of the town of Qalqilya. Its position on the 
West Bank border and its almost total enclosure by Ariel Sharon’s dividing wall, places it right 
on the faultline of conflict, explaining the high level of local support for the hard-line posture of 
Hamas. Despite the fact that Hamas is rhetorically committed to the destruction of Israel the 
nature of municipal governance renders necessary some communication between local 
governments. The Qalqilya mayor and his deputy made it clear that they were willing to deal with 
surrounding Israeli municipalities on matters relating to electricity or sewage. By the same token, 
while the Israeli foreign ministry has repeatedly stated that they will have no dealings with 
Hamas, a senior Israeli commander in the West Bank has said that he will deal with all mayors, 
whatever their political party (BBC Radio 4, 2005).   
 
Conclusion 
 
Urban acts of terror are only one aspect of how violence is experience in cities. However, they 
are increasingly a defining component of urban wars of the 21st century. They have increased our 
sense of the vulnerability of cities as objects of war and targets of attack and they often signal the 
link between local conflicts and global forces. The ‘Cities and Fragile States’ component of the 
Crisis States Research Centre has begun to undertake systematic comparative studies of a number 
of large urban centres of countries in the developing world that have become sites of  21st century 
urban warfare. Early findings show that cities absorb much of the impact of national, regional and 
often internationally fuelled conflict. However, urban centres are also sites of reconstruction and 
peace-building in the wake of war. The tragedy of acts of urban terror is that they undermine the 
capacity of cities and urban citizens to contribute to recovery, restitution and state-making. 
 
In highlighting the ways in which acts of terror impact on cities of the South, a distinction has 
been made between cities in the ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ worlds. This is more than simply a 
heuristic device. Cities in the world’s poorer countries experience terrorist acts with greater 
frequency and often with more devastating effect than in economically advanced countries. 
Nevertheless, given the globalisation of terror networks, the permeability of international 
boundaries and the fact that characteristics defining the urban experience in Bogotá, 
Johannesburg and Los Angeles increasingly overlap, the distinction between ‘developed’ and 
‘developing’ cities does tend to break down in ways that are not necessarily replicated at the 
national level. The extreme differentials of wealth in cities of many developed countries parallel 
those in the cities of the South, as does the way the increasing incidence of urban violence has 
entrenched social divisions and distance. Cities like Detroit are characterized by decaying 
infrastructure, half-ruined cityscapes and levels of gang and ethnic violence to rival the 
megacities of the developing world (Graham, 2004, p. 44). There is a vibrancy, creativity and 
strong sense of order that underpin the seemingly informal and chaotic working and living 
arrangements of low income urban communities in the South (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1989). 
This is increasingly evident in cities of the North. Urban places everywhere are more likely to be 
heterogeneous than rural areas. Indeed, the very reasons for terrorist acts targeted at Istanbul or 
Mumbai are not dissimilar to those aimed at New York, Madrid or London.  
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Particularly in cities of the South it is difficult to define acts of terrorism, given the ‘conceptual 
minefield that is the current state of classification and understanding of political violence’ (Shaw, 
2004). Moreover, local acts of urban political violence can become entangled in the vicious cycle 
of terrorism and counter terrorism that characterises the ‘War on Terror’. Neither is 
differentiating terrorism from civil war not straightforward, for example, in a country like India 
where separatist causes are rife. In a city such as Bogotá, where urban violence takes many 
forms, it often becomes difficult to know where terrorism begins and violent crime ends, as 
pointed out in this policy arena by Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín, especially given that Colombian 
terrorism is tightly bound together with the narcotics industry. The mayor of Bogotá has sought 
to play down the relevance of the distinction, stating: ‘We’re not interested in intent – whether 
political or not, [violence] is a disease that we need to cure … the important thing is to preserve 
lives’ (Regan-Sachs, 2001). The difficulty in determining the point at which urban violence 
becomes terrorism is illustrated by Sophie Body-Gendrot, who argues that in some cases ‘Inter- 
social urban violence is not political per se but becomes political through its generated effects, 
that is via the potential exploitative strategies open to political actors’ (Body-Gendrot, 1994, p. 
215). Ultimately though, it is acts of terror that remain a defining feature of terrorism. It was the 
act of planting bombs in two cinemas in New Delhi in May 2005, by the militant Sikh 
organisation, Babbar Khalsa International, that rendered the incident terrorist rather than simply a 
gesture of Sikh separatism.  
 
The analysis presented here exposes something of a paradox: it is noted that cities of the South 
experience terrorism very differently to those of the North, and yet at the same time urban 
terrorism also reveals the analytical weaknesses of a rigid binary between developed/developing 
cities. To make sense of this it is helpful to return to the distinction between risks and 
vulnerabilities. While vulnerability is more blatantly evident in the South, international terrorism 
has somewhat leveled the risk of exposure to political violence. Issues of proportionality aside, it 
has become clear that the risks faced by cities in the North and South are very similar, both with 
respect to terrorist acts and, more recently, other dangers such as environmental hazards. Yet it is 
the particular vulnerabilities of urban populations of developing societies, which result in 
differences in the ultimate outcomes. 
 
A developing/developed country binary can also be misleading in relation to political violence. 
Mockus, in analysing attempts to alleviate crime in Bogotá, is explicit that some ‘should also be 
recognized as important issues for American society’ (Mockus, 2004, p. 11). Far from being at 
opposite ends of a spectrum, the cities of both the North and South are not only afflicted by many 
of the same problems, but are bound together in their affliction. Views based on rigid binaries are 
problematic and indeed often serve to sustain political violence. It is just such an approach that 
allows al-qa’ida to proclaim everyone in New York a legitimate target, or for the American 
Administration to refer to hundreds of civilian deaths in Baghdad or Kabul as ‘collateral 
damage’. Ultimately the most significant dimension of urban terrorism is that it is an international 
problem requiring both local and global resolution. This resolution, however, cannot be bought at 
the expense of development.  
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